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FEDERAL BUSINESS LAW AND THE INDIANA LAWYER:
THE IMPACT OF THE SECURITIES LAW ON THE GENERAL
PRACTITIONER
THEODORE R. BOEHMt
Recent years have seen the development of a substantial body of
"federal corporation law" through the medium of the antifraud provisions
of the federal securities laws. This law, of general application to com-
mercial transactions, is neither wholly federal nor limited to corporations.
Unfortunately, much of the publicity attending this phenomenon has
been directed only at "securities lawyers" who are already familiar with
the rapid growth of the law in this area. The purpose of this article is to
alert the general bar to the very significant impact of securities laws on
the many transactions and cases which are often undertaken without
regard to this potentially dominant aspect. If anything is certain in the
securities field, it is the rapidity of its current development. As a corollary,
no one can predict with confidence the ultimate parameters of many of
the causes of action that are now lurking around the legal countryside
waiting to be uncovered. Thus, from time to time, theories are discussed
that are at present only a gleam in the eye of some imaginative plaintiff's
attorney and may not stand up under judicial scrutiny.
SOME ARTIFICIAL DEFINITIONS
At the outset the reader should have some notion of the sense in
which the term "security" is used in this article. Although there are
statutory definitions of "security" in most of the relevant laws, these are
often less than precise and typically conclude with a catch-all, such as, "any
interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security'."' Thus, it is
hardly surprising that the courts and administrative authorities have pro-
duced some nonstatutory doctrines affording varying degrees of assistance
in concluding whether a security is involved. The basic distinction is one
of passive investment versus active and significant participation in the
management of a business. The less active role a contributor has in
a business the more likely he is to be classified as an investor in a security.
Thus "security" includes the customary forms of stock, personal and cor-
porate debt instruments, puts and calls, stock options, and interests in oil
t Partner: Baker & Daniels, Indianapolis. Member of the Indiana Bar.
1. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970) [hereinafter referred
to as the 1933 Act]; Indiana Securities Law § 101(k), Iun. CODE § 23-2-1-1(u) (1971),
I1. ANN. STAT. § 25-854(k) (1970).
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and gas participations. It also may embrace interests in cattle herds,2
voting trusts and investment partnerships,' franchises, 4 and even coun-
try club memberships.'
The term "material" omission or "material" misstatement appears
throughout the civil liability sections of the securities laws.' Unfortu-
nately, it is far easier to define materiality than it is to determine whether
a specific statement or omission is material in a given context. One gen-
erally accepted standard of "material omission" is whether the specific
fact, if known, would have made a difference to the reasonable investor in
determining to buy or sell.7 It is important to note that this formulation
does not turn on whether the particular plaintiff would have acted dif--
ferently. That is the issue of "reliance," discussed later in this article. In
Indiana, a procedure exists for obtaining a ruling from the Securities
Commissioner as to the materiality of statements or omissions in regis-
tration statements." Whether such a ruling insulates a prospectus from
civil liabilty has not yet been judicially determined.
Most of the severe liabilities that may arise under the securities laws
are generated by some form of transaction constituting an acquisition or
disposition of a security. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Ace
requires a "purchase or sale" of a security to precipitate civil liability."0
Transactions that may constitute a "purchase" or a "sale" within
the meaning of that and other sections are far more varied than the normal
stock purchase, however. At the outset, statutory definitions broaden the
concepts somewhat. For example, any "contract to . . . acquire" is a
"purchase" under § 3(a) (13) of the Securities Exchange Act.11 Even
this expansive definition does not suggest all of the transactions that might
constitute a purchase or sale. These may include statutory mergers and
2. SEC Interpretive Letter, American Dairy Leasing Corp., 71-72 CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. V 78, 584, at 81, 255 (Dec. 3, 1972).
3. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4877 (Aug. 8, 1967).
4. Tucker Corp., 26 S.E.C. 249 (1947). See also 49 Op. CAL. Ar'Y GEN. 124
(1967).
5. Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal.
Rptr. 186 (1961) ; Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 1135 (1961).
6. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 §§ 11(a), 12(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a),
771(2) (1970) ; Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1970).
7. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
811 (1965). In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), this standard was elaborated considerably in the context
of securities regularly traded in a market.
8. Ind. Sec. Reg. § 5.01 (1968), Burns Ind. Adm. Reg. § 25-859-4 (Supp. 1972).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970).
10. Whether a § 10(b) claimant need be a party to the purchase or sale is prob-
lematic. See text accompanying notes 72-75 infra.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (13).
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eonsolidations,"2 the formation of a close or publicly held corporation, a
personal loan" transaction, 3 the making of a buy-sell agreement, restrict-
ing transfer of shares in a close corporation, stock redemptions, corporate
dissolutions,"4 formation of certain types of limited partnerships," pledges
and security interests, 6 and perhaps even amendments to a corporation's
articles of incorporation if the terms of its securities are altered." In
short, any transaction that involves the creation or exchange of a security
for cash or another security may be viewed as a purchase or sale subject
to the securities laws.
IAN OVERVIEW OF THE SECURITIES LAWS
In order to understand the exposure of various transactions to attack
under the securities laws, it is necessary to have a basic grasp of what those
laws are and what they are designed to do. Unfortunately, as in all com-
plex legal matters, some effort must be expended in understanding what
these laws are likely to be in the future as well as grasping their present
form.
There are six federal statutes that are generally referred to as "securi-
ties 'laws."1 In addition, every state except Delaware has some form of
state securities law, collected under the title of "blue sky" statutes. Of the
federal statutes, only two come into play in the context of the usual trans-
action contemplated by this article. These are the Securities Act of
193319 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934."0
At least in form, the 1933 Act imposes no material substantive stan-
dards regarding the quality of securities registered under its provisions.
It proceeds exclusively on a disclosure philosophy, assuming that if the
12. SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969). Apparently, this is
not true under Indiana's blue sky law, which excludes transactions incident to class
votes of shareholders from the definition of "sales." Indiana Securities Law §
101(i) (7), IND. CODE § 23-2-1-1 (i) (7) (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-854(i) (7) (1970).
13. See Anderson v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 291 F. Supp. 705 (D. Minn. 1968),
in which the court elaborated some of the circumstances under which commercial paper
and private notes are deemed "securities."
14. Coffee v. Permian Corp., 434 F.2d 383 (5th.Cir. 1970).
15. United States v. Wernes, 157 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1946).
16. Investment Properties Int'l, Ltd. v. I.O.S., Ltd., 70-71 CCH SEc. L. REP.
93,011 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 1971).
. , 17. Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Sobieski, 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719
(1961).
. 18. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1970); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1970); Public Utility Holding Company Act of
1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79 et seq. (1970); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa
et seq. (1970); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 et seq. (1970);
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 et seq. (1970).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1970).
20. Id. § 78a et seq. [hereinafter referred to as the 1934 Act].
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investor knows the facts, the decision to buy or not to buy is appropriately
left to him. The fundamental concept of the 1933 Act is the requirement
that offerings of securities be registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission unless exempt under some provision of that Act.2 Regis-
tration requires the distribution of a prospectus containing an elaborate
and detailed description of the issuer and the offering.
The most commonly invoked exemptions from registration are the
so-called private offering exemption afforded by § 4(2) of the Act2 ' and
the intrastate offering exempted by § 3(a) (11 )." Elaboration of the
pitfalls inherent in each of these exemptions has been provided in several
published sources and need not be repeated here. Suffice it to say that the
nature of a private offering is determined by an extremely severe test of
sophistication of the offerees combined with their access to virtually all
of the information that would have been supplied if the offering had been
registered and if an SEC approved prospectus had been delivered.24 The
test of sophistication, number, and access to information is not applied to
buyers; it is applied to offerees. Thus, at least in the view of the SEC, a
sale to only one purchaser could constitute a public offering if other of-
fers are made to a large number of persons or if the one buyer has insuf-
ficient ability to fend for himself. As to what constitutes an offer for these
purposes, one authority has only half jokingly responded "everything."
In any event, it should be noted that the concept of offer as used in the
securities field is much broader than traditional contract notions of the
term. There is no doubt that the problems of proving offers to a sufficient
number of sufficiently unsophisticated persons are significant, particularly
in the absence of any documentation. Two final points: first, the rule of
thumb that less than 25 offerees is safe as a private offering is merely
that-a rule of thumb.2" Any knowledgeable plaintiffs' securities lawyer
would be happy to represent 24 widows and orphans on a contingent fee.
Second, there is a chance that several distinct private offerings can be
21. Id. § 77e.
22. Id. §77d(2).
23. Id. § 77c(a) (11).
24. The leading case on this matter is SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119(1953). More recent decisions have caused concern about whether the exemption
remains viable despite stiffer requirements of establishing access to pertinent matter.
SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972).
25. This number evolved from an early advisory letter of the general counsel of
the SEC. SEC Securities Act Release No. 285 (June 22, 1935). The present draft of
the American Law Institute codification project proposes that a test of 35 buyers be
adopted so that much of the anxiety of those relying on this exemption will be relieved.
The SEC is also considering adoption of a new Rule 146, which focuses on buyers
rather than offerees, and is designed to clarify the private placement exemption. See
BNA SEc. REaG. L. REP., at A-3 (Aug. 16, 1972).
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integrated to produce one large violation of the registration require-
ment."6 The point is again a simple one: know the purchaser, the issuer
and the means of sale before venturing into the tricky business of a
private offering.
Reliance on the intrastate offering for exemption from federal regis-
tration is equally hazardous. This exemption requires that every offeree,
not just every buyer, be a bona fide resident of the state within whose
boundaries the offering is to take place." A plaintiff's lawyer may find it
difficult to prove an offer to a nonresident, but it must be remembered that
only one such offer is necessary to void the entire exemption as to all
offerees. It is no defense that the agent making the offer mistakenly
thought the offeree was a resident; nor does rescission of the out-of-state
offer rectify the violation, though it may mitigate damages. Once again
the concept of "offer" is broader than the traditional common law con-
tract concept. Finally, although use of the mails or facilities of interstate
commerce is required to trigger the federal registration requirement,2"
few reported decisions have failed to find that requirement discharged,2"
however strained their reasoning may seem.
The 1934 Act is also based on the theory of full disclosure. It im-
poses no substantive requirements on issuers of securities-only reporting
and disclosure requirements."0 The key to most of the provisions of the
1934 Act is again registration, but, in this case, it is not the type of
transaction which triggers application of the Act but rather the status of
the company. Thus, the Act applies to issuers listed on a national ex-
change or those with 1,000,000 dollars in assets and 500 equity security
26. See, e.g., SEC Interpretive Letter, Presidential Realty Corp., 70-71 CCH
FED. SEC. L. Rp. ff 78. 066, at 80, 316 (Feb. 19, 1971).
27. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 202(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (11) (1970);
SEC Securities Act Release No. 4434 (Dec. 6, 1961).
28. Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970).
29. The use of the mails or interstate transportation need only be in connection
with the sale or offer, and any such use, whether or not by a particular defendant, is
sufficient. See, e.g., Little v. United States, 331 F.2d 287 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 834 (1964) (jurisdiction sustained on the basis of mailings by the defendant's
bank in the course of clearing checks obtained through fraud). In respect to local
telephone use, compare Burke v. Triple A Machine Shop, Inc., 438 F.2d 978 (9th Cir.
1971) (an intrastate call is not sufficient for federal jurisdiction), with Myzel v.
Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968) (the telephone
network is an integrated interstate facility and a local call is sufficient to establish
federal jurisdiction).
30. Under §§ 16(a) and (b) of the 1934 Act, a corporation's directors, officers
and ten per cent shareholders are liable to the issuer for profits from purchases
and sales within any six-month period. This has given rise to a number of nice legal
questions, but it applies only to companies that are registered under § 12(g), and is
therefore beyond the scope of this comment.
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holders2' As usual, this requirement hinges on an army of definitions
and a number of relatively exotic exemptions, but as a general proposition,
if the issuer has met the 1,000,000 dollar/500 shareholder test, it is sub-
ject to the 1934 Act provisions governing reporting, proxy, insider
trading and tender offers. Although these requirements were originally
regarded as the heart of the 1934 Act, they have now been surpassed in
significance by the antifraud provisions of § 10(b)."
The remaining federal statutes have relatively limited application to
transactions counseled by the general practitioner. It should be noted,
however, that it is possible to inadvertently become an investment
company subject to registration and substantive regulation, through
mergers or consolidations in which one party receives cash or
securities and becomes a holding company with over 100 shareholders.33
Similarly, one may become an investment adviser subject to registration
and regulation by the SEC without intending to do so through certain
activities directed towards advising or counseling others, even other
members of a limited partnership.
In addition to federal regulation, the general practitioner should be
familiar with Indiana's securities laws. Virtually every state has a blue
sky law similar to the 1933 Act requiring registration of certain offerings
or sales of securities. The exemptions and definitions differ widely
among the various states, and no effort is made here to enumerate or
analyze the laws of states other than Indiana. The Indiana Securities
Law"' is patterned on the Uniform Securities Act, which is itself far
from uniform among the states that have adopted it. Nonetheless, the
basic format of the Indiana Act is reasonably similar to other versions
of the uniform act, and decisions from other states are sometimes useful
in interpreting the Indiana version.3
Like the 1933 Act, Indiana requires registration of all transactions
unless some exemption is available.37 The state exemption most fre-
quently relied upon is the analog to the federal private offering exemp-
tion.3" Like the federal act, this exemption depends on the number of
31. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 12(a), 12(g), 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(a),
781(g) (1970).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1970).
33. Id. § 80a-3(c) (1).
34. William M. Ryan, 70-71 CCH FED. SEc. L. RE. 78, 102, at 80, 393 (Mar.
2, 1971).
35. IND. CODE § 23-2-1-1 et seq. (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-854 et seq. (1970).
36. The statutes and decisional law of all states are reported in CCH Blue Sky
Reporter.
37. Indiana Securities Law § 201, IND. CoDE § 23-2-1-3 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 25-856 (1970).
38. Indiana Securities Law § 102(b) (10), IND. CODE § 23-2-1-2 (1971), IND.
ANN. STAT. § 25-855(b) (10) (1970).
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offers rather than the number of sales. However, unlike the federal act.
the state statute prescribes a specific number of offers-20 Indiana re-
cipients in any twelve month period-which may be made without regis-
tration with the Indiana Securities Commissioner. The exemption also
requires that (1) no commission be paid for the placement and (2) the
buyer represents in writing his intention to hold for investment."0 Several
problems can be encountered in the computation of the number of offerees,
and little help is found in either judicial or secondary authority. For
example, there may be difficulties generated by offers to partnerships,
trusts or even corporations and by offers made by persons other than the
issuer. Fortunately, the Indiana Securities Commissioner is often willing
to offer a prompt resolution of problems before they escalate into
violations of the state securities laws.
The state securities laws also regulate broker-dealers," provide
antifraud penalties,4 ' and establish administrative procedures.42  How-
ever, unlike the federal acts, they also impose limitations on such matters
as underwriters' compensation43 and promoters' interests in the venture."'
THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ANTIFRAUD VIOLATION
Three basic results can issue from a securities violation: (1) an
administrative agency can enter cease and desist orders; (2) the persons
responsible can be imprisoned; and (3) civil liability can be imposed.
The last of these three receives the most serious attention from the
securities bar, since the potential liabilities are enormous, difficult to
foresee, and confront virtually everyone involved in the offering. While
most of these liabilities are expressly provided for by statute, they have
often been ignored by the victims of securities law violations and their
lawyers until it was too late.
Liability Under Federal Securities Laws
The first and most basic civil liability provision is § 11 (a) of the
39. Indiana Securities Law § 102(b) (10), INn. CoDE § 23-2-1-2 (1971), INn.
ANN. STAT. § 25-855(b) (10) (1970). This section also authorizes the Securities
Commissioner to waive conditions or increase the number of offerees with respect to a
given transaction.
40. Indiana Securities Law § 301 et seq., IND. CoDE § 23-2-1-8 (1971), IND. ANN.
STAT. § 25-862 et seq. (1970).
41. Indiana Securities Law § 401, INn. CODE § 23-2-1-12 (1971), IND. ANN.
STAT. § 25-866 (1970).
42. Indiana Securities Law § 503, IND. CODE § 23-2-1-15 (1971), IND. ANN.
STAT. § 25-869 (1970).
43. Sec. Div. Rule 8.01 (1969), Burns Ann. Rules & Reg. (25-859)-11 (Supp.
1972).
44. Sec. Div. Rule 8.04 (1969), Burns Ann. Rules & Reg. (25-859)-13 (Supp.
1972).
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1933 Act which creates a liability for misstatements or material omissions
in a federal registration statement.45 Thus, if no registration is filed with
the SEC, there can be no § 11 (a) liability, despite the fact that a registra-
tion statement should have been filed. The magic language triggering §
11(a) liability is either the inclusion of: "an untrue statement of a
material fact" or the omission of "a material fact... necessary to make
the statements therein not misleading. . . ."" Though minor variants
developed over the years, this language has remained as the keystone
of civil liability under this and other antifraud provisions of the secur-
ities laws.
Certain limitations on this liability are provided by the statute: (1)
the statute of limitations is one year from the discovery of the misstate-
ment or omission;4 (2) the purchaser must prove he relied on the
omission or misstatement;48 and (3) the defendant may avoid liability by
proving both that he believed the statement to be complete and accurate
and that this belief was reasonable based on a fair investigation to
determine the facts.49 However, since the statute merely defines reason-
able belief or investigation as " that required of a prudent man in the
management of his own property,""0 the statutory defenses often prove
to be soft footings in a litigation context and therefore cannot be relied
on too heavily. The damages recoverable under this section are also pro-
vided by statute and award to the plaintiff, subject to certain qualifica-
tions, the difference between the price paid and the value at the time of
sale or institution of the suit."
Section 12(1) of the 1933 Act creates a cause of action for selling
or offering unregistered securities which are required to be registered
under § 5 of the Act. Therefore, unlike § 11(a), § 12(1) can impose
liability even if no registration statement has been filed. Under this
section, the person "purchasing the security from" the defendant has a
cause of action for the difference between the price he paid and the price
at which he later sold the security. 2 In the event that the purchaser
still owns the security, the statute provides him with an action for re-
scission. 3 The statute of limitations governing this section is one year
from the unregistered offer or sale. 4
45. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1970).
46. Id.
47. Id. § 77m.
48. Id. § 77k(a).
49. Id. § 77k(b).
50. Id. § 77k(c).
51. Id. § 77k(e).
52. Id. § 771.
53. Id.
54. Id. § 77m.
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Section 12(2) allows the same measure of recovery to the same
purchasers as § 12(1). Here, the basis for recovery is the offering or
selling of a security "by means of a prospectus or oral communication"
which either (1) includes an untrue statement of a material fact or (2)
omits a material fact necessary to make the facts stated not misleading."5
Again, there is a statutory defense if the defendant can establish that he
did not know, and reasonably should not have known, of the misstate-
ment or omission." Since any communication which offers a security
is a prospectus, this section covers any transaction in any security if the
requisite use of the mails or interstate facilities is involved, as it usually
is. This section has a one-year statute of limitations, running from the
discovery of the omission or misstatement, but in no event extending to
more than three years from the date of sale."
Section 17 (a) of the 1933 Act is a general declaration that it is
unlawful for any person "in the offer or sale" of securities, "directly or
indirectly":
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue
statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon the purchaser.58
While it has been commonly held that this section creates civil
liability,5" the parameters of that liability are still somewhat unclear.
As just discussed, § 12(2) creates an express liability for the same basic
wrong, but includes a relatively short limitations period, requires that
the purchaser have purchased from the defendant and creates a defense
based on the defendant's reasonable ignorance of the misstatement or
omission. From this it has been argued that any liability implied from
violation of § 17 must be similarly restricted. Unfortunately for those
who deal in securities, and to the enormous benefit of many plaintiffs,
55. Id. § 771(2).
56. Id.
57. Id. § 77m.
58. Id. § 77q(a).
59. Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
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most courts either have not found these contentions persuasive or have
simply ignored them."° This is largely a result of the fact that § 17 (a)
claims are usually bolstered by allegations of violations of § 10(b) of
the 1934 Act. However, there are some potentially significant distinc-
tions between § 17(a) and § 10(b). For example, since § 17(a) governs
statements and omissions "in the sale of securities," it is unclear whether
the section applies to persons other than the seller, whereas § 10(b)
applies to all communications "in connection with" a purchase or sale.6"
As a practical matter though, as the courts expanded § 10(b), they also
expanded § 17(a), apparently without any attention to possible distinc-
tions. Dicta appears in several cases implying, if not stating, that §
17(a) doctrines are identical to those of § 10(b).2
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act is the greenhouse in which most
federal securities litigation has flourished. This provision prohibits
employing "any manipulative or deceptive devise or contrivance"" in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security, in violation of any
SEC rule. In 1942, the Commission promulgated Rule 10b-5 4 which
was generally assumed to protect sellers in the same way that § 17 (a)
protected buyers. The language of Rule lOb-5 is substantially identical
to § 17(a) except for this shift in focus. It has been commonly held
that Rule 10b-5 creates a cause of action for those injured by violations
of the rule,"" but the precise elements of this cause of action remain
somewhat unclear. A Rule lOb-5 claim may arise "in connection with"
any "purchase" or "sale" of any "security" as long as there is some use
of the mails or interstate transportation. There is no statute of limita-
tions and no express requirement of privity; nor does the Rule indicate
who the plaintiff must be or in what relationship to the defendant he must
stand. Finally, there is no express defense based on good faith or absence
of knowledge of the misstatement or omission. Because of this absence
of restrictions on 10b-5 liability, the practical consequence of the Rule is
to eliminate or weaken the various statutory defenses to civil liability
60. Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills, Inc., 455 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1972) (statute
of limitations); Dorfman v. First Boston Corp., 336 F. Supp. 1089 (E.D. Pa. 1972)
(§ 12 limits apply to § 17(a) (2) but not to §§ 17(a) (1) or (a) (3)).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970).
62. See, e.g., Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank, 326 F. Supp. 1186, 1193 (N.D. Ill.
1970).
63. 15 U.S.C. §78i (b) (1970).
64. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972).
65. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). Since
the 1934 Act was principally directed to problems of large publicly owned companies
and their securities, it is ironic that the first case to find that Rule lob-5 created
civil liability involved a corporation with only four shareholders.
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under the 1933 Act. As a result 10b-5 has largely swallowed up the
express causes of action under the federal laws.
Blue Sky Civil Liability
Section 507 of the Indiana blue sky law contains a civil liability
provision derived from the uniform securities law and common to many
states. 6  It states:
(a) Any person who
(1) offers or sells a security in violation of sections 201
[requiring registration of security offerings unless exempt],
204(d) [requiring delivery of an "adequate" prospectus],
301 (a) [requiring registration of broker-dealers and agents]
or 502(b) [prohibiting representing that the Commission has
approved the merits of the registered issue] ; or
(2) offers or sells a security by means of any untrue
statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading
(the buyer not knowing of the untruth or omission), and who
does not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and
in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the
untruth or omission, is liable to the person buying the security
from him, who may sue either at law or in equity to recover
the consideration paid for the security, together with interest
at six per cent per year from the date of payment, costs, and
reasonable attorneys' fees, less the amount of any income re-
ceived on the security, upon the tender of the security and any
income received on it, or for damages if he no longer owns the
security. Damages are the amount that would be recoverable
upon a tender less the value of the security when the buyer
disposed of it and interest at six per cent per year from the date
of disposition."7
It should be noted that subsection (2) looks remarkably like § 12(2)
of the 1933 Act, except that it requires no use of the mails and it in-
cludes an award of attorneys' fees. Like § 12(2), it is limited to suits
66. IN . CoDE § 23-2-1-19 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-873 (1970). See also
ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRp. AcT § 410 (1959) [hereinafter cited as MoDEL AcT].
67. IND. CODE § 23-2-1-19 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-873 (1970).
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by buyers and creates a cause of action only against the seller. The
statute of limitations is two years from discovery.
The attorneys' fees in securities litigation often run into six digits.
Unlike the state statutes, no provision of federal securities laws awards
attorneys' fees for the successful claimant. The lesson is fairly clear:
one should accompany any § 12(2) claim with a claim under § 507(a) (2)
of the Indiana Act in either federal or state court. Federal pendent
jurisdiction over the state claim is at least arguable if a § 12(2) claim
is asserted, and state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over
a § 12(2) claim. If the plaintiff must rely on § 17(a) or Rule 10b-5,
the elements of the state and federal claims are somewhat different, and
federal jurisdiction over the § 507 (a) (2) claim may be challenged in
the absence of diversity of citizenship.
Section 507(a) (1) does not create a cause of action for violation
of § 401, which is a substantially verbatim reproduction of Rule 10b-5
except that no use of the mails is required. Prior to 1967, it was clear
that the express causes of action under § 507(a) (1) for violation of the
listed sections were the sole remedy for private plaintiffs under the
Indiana Act. This certainty was expressed by paragraph (h) of § 507
which read:
(h) The rights and remedies provided by this act are in
addition to any other rights or remedies that may exist at law
or in equity but this act does not create a cause of action not
sponsored in this section 302 (b). 8
The emphasized language was deleted when § 507 was re-enacted in 1967,
giving rise to the presently untested contention that an implied cause of
action has been created under Indiana law for what would be Rule lOb-5
violations under federal law, whether or not use of mails is involved."9
WHO CAN SUE
Obviously the individual most likely to bring suit for a securities
law violation is the buyer who purchased from a defective prospectus or
in direct reliance on some material misstatement or omission. If a
registration statement has been filed, the plaintiff has claims under § 11
68. Ch. 333, § 507(h), [1961] Ind. Acts 1864 (emphasis added).
69. The states that have adopted § 410 of the uniform act, MODEL AcT, supra note
68, without the phrase that has been deleted from § 507(h) have not had frequent oppor-
tunity to consider the question. See Shermer v. Baker, 2 Wash. App. 845, 472 P.2d 589
(1970), finding such an implied cause of action. The Uniform Act was drafted to pre-
vent the implication of causes of action. See L. Loss & E. CowETr, BLUE SKY LAv 395
(1958).
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of the 1933 Act and § 507(a) (1) of the Indiana securities laws.7
Whether or not the offering has been registered, the plaintiff still has
claims under §§ 12(2) and 17(a) of the 1933 Act, § 10(b) of the 1934
Act and § 507 (a) (2) of the Indiana Act. While there may be an
implied claim for violation of § 401 of the Indiana Act, the remedy
may be available only to a seller. For reasons of largely historical interest,
a defrauded seller has no claim under § 12(2) or § 507 (a) (2) and
must resort to §§ 10(b), 17(a) 7 1 or 401 for relief.
Relief for parties other than buyers or sellers remains unclear.
Until relatively recently, Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.72 was thought
to establish a requirement that only buyers or sellers may invoke Rule
10b-5." However, in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co.,7"
the Supreme Court apparently abolished this requirement. In that case,
the plaintiff's Treasury bonds were sold for it by the defendant to a
third party. Although there was no misrepresentation or fraud in the
sale, the Court held that this sale was an essential part of an alleged plot
to defraud the plaintiff, and thus the fraud was "in connection with" that
sale in violation of Rule 10b-5."5 As a practical matter, it would seem that
some form of sale can be found or created in most transactions to trigger
10b-5 application if the fraud need not occur "in" a sale but rather only
"in connection with" that sale.
The limits of this expansion of Rule 10b-5 protection are presently
not discernible. It is noteworthy, however, that the Bankers Life &
Casualty opinion was unanimous in expressly rejecting the notion that
Rule 10b-5 is limited to frauds that relate to "the integrity of the
securities markets, ' 7  concluding that:
Section 10(b) must be read flexibly, not technically and re-
70. Section 507(a) (1) covers violations of § 204(a), which requires that an
"adequate" prospectus be delivered to offerees in a registered offering. A material mis-
statement or omission presumably renders a prospectus inadequate. IND. CODE § 23-2-1-5
(1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-859(d) (1970).
71. It has been held that only purchasers may invoke § 17(a) on the theory that it
relates to fraud "in the sale" of securities. Support for this view lies in the fact that
subparagraph (3) of § 17(a) speaks of fraud "on the purchaser." See, e.g., Simmons
v. Wolfson, 428 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 999 (1971); Super-
intendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 430 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1970), rez'd on other
grounds, 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
72. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
73. Birnbaum involved a suit by a shareholder of Newport Steel alleging fraud
in the sale of control of Newport at the expense of the plaintiff and other minority
shareholders. This claim was rejected under lOb-5 because Birnbaum had neither
purchased nor sold. 193 F.2d at 463.
74. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
75. Id. at 12.
76. Id.
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strictively. Since there was a "sale" of a security, and since
fraud was used "in connection with" it, there is redress under
§ 10(b) whatever might be available as a remedy under state
law.
77
Until the Supreme Court clarifies this issue, Rule 10b-5 claims may be
anticipated wherever a security is sold or bought at a loss caused by
some misleading or deceptive scheme whether or not the security was
itself misleadingly described.
Section 12(2) and § 507(a) (2) require that the plaintiff "not
know of" the untruth or omissions.7 1 Presumably, materiality of the
omitted or misstated facts added to the purchaser's ignorance amounts to
reliance, except in the case of the incompetent plaintiff or the expert
who may not have acted differently even if the material fact were dis-
closed. Some form of "reliance" has long been contended to be essential
to a § 17(a) or a § 10(b) claim. This theory is based on two premises:
(1) these statutory fraud provisions carry over some elements of com-
mon law fraud, one of which is the requirement of reliance; and (2)
since these sections only imply, rather than expressly provide, a cause
of action for their violation, they should not be so free of statutory
defenses that they swallow up causes of action which are expressly stated.
The obvious form of reliance occurs in the case of a buyer or seller
who acts while conscious of the facts as stated and who would, if apprised
of the whole story, have acted otherwise. This type of reliance is clearly
sufficient under existing decisions to sustain a plaintiff under both
§ 17(a) and Rule 10b-5. One problem area revolves around the plaintiff
who is dragged into his purchase or sale by the actions of others, even
though he himself is not misled. A common example is a statutory
merger requiring only a simple majority vote of shareholders to become
effective under Indiana corporate law. The consequence of the merger is
to effect a "sale" of the acquiring corporation's shares to the shareholders
of the acquired corporation. Notwithstanding his knowledge of the mis-
statement, an outvoted minority shareholder may invoke Rule 10b-5 and
presumably § 17(a) if the affirmative vote of the majority was based on
a violation of Rule 10b-5.7' A different form of reliance may be found in
the plaintiff's right to "rely" on a correct market place evaluation of his
77. Id. Despite the language quoted in the text, the Court expressly reserved what
it called the "standing" issue of Birnbaum, id. at 13 n.10, and some lower courts con-
tinue to follow Birnbaum. See, e.g., Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339
(9th Cir. 1972).
78. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970); IND. CODE § 23-2-1-19 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. §
25-873 (1970).
79. See Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1972).
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securities. Thus, if nondisclosure produces a different market price than
if full disclosure had been made, the reliance requirement might be satis-
fied. No reported case has expressly adopted such a theory, but one recent
case suggests that a plaintiff may establish such reliance to show the extent
of damages but not the fact of liability."0 In substance, it seems that the
courts are presently settling on the concept of causation as a substitute for
reliance, although this focus is still unclear.
The plaintiffs' most potent weapon under the securities laws is Rule
23 of the federal and Indiana rules of procedure, which permits any mem-
ber of a class to assert the claims of all other members as well as his own.
Such class actions may aggregate numerous minor claims to reach often
staggering totals.8 In class action litigation, the successful plaintiffs'
attorney is entitled to compensation from the entire class. Some courts
have taken the view that the amount of the attorney's fees depends upon
the size of the recovered fund, furnishing plaintiffs' lawyers with a con-
siderable incentive to vindicate the rights of the plaintiff's co-victims. 2
The point is simply that securities transactions by their nature often in-
volve dealings with groups of persons, no one of whom may find it econo-
mic to sue but who, when aggregated, are more than adequately spurred
to litigation.
WHO CAN BiE SuED
Sections 11, 12(2) and 507(a) (1) and (2) provide for a cause of
action by the buyer only against the seller. Rule 10b-5 has no such limi-
tation, however, since the Bankers Life & Casualty case erased any
privity requirements. A plaintiff who can establish loss from his purchase
or sale and the defendant's violation of Rule 10b-5 "in connection with"
that sale no longer needs to establish that he bought from or sold to the
defendant.
Whether § 17(a) is free from a privity requirement is not entirely
clear. Some courts have discussed § 17(a) claims and § 10(b) claims as
though they were interchangeable.83 There are cases, however, in which
it may be of critical significance whether the claim is maintained under
80. Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971).
81. A recent example is the assertion of a seventy dollar claim for alleged viola-
tions of the 1934 Act in odd lot transactions on the national exchanges. The plaintiff
claimed to represent 3,750,000 other plaintiffs with claims of similar size. The District
Court found that a class action of this size was feasible, and ordered that notice be sent
to 5,000 random members of the class and be published in the Wall Street Journal and
New York, San Francisco and Los Angeles newspapers. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
82. See generally Annot., 38 A.L.R.3d 1384 (1971).
83. E.g., Schaefer v: First Nat'l Bank, 326 F. Supp. 1186, 1193 (N.D. Ili. 1970).
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17(a) or § 10(b), and in such a case the defense of absence of privity
under § 17(a) should be asserted.
By statute certain persons other than the issuer or seller may be liable
for misstatements in a registration statement. As a general proposition
these include management, controlling shareholders, and experts, notably
accountants, named in the registration statement.84 Persons controlling
the seller are also expressly liable by statute for violations of § § 11 and
12 and § 507(a)." The question of who constitutes a control person is
a favorite topic of securities lawyers and often leads to some surprising
results, such as the inclusion of public accountants in this category. 6
Additionally, officers or employees of issuing corporations occasional-
ly have been known to act as "agents" in effecting sales of stock. Unless
these persons are themselves registered as agents or exempt under §
101 (b)," they may be acting in violation of § 301 (a) of the Indiana
securities law and therefore liable under § 507 (a) (1).
In addition to the statutory liability imposed on accountants, engin-
eers, appraisers and other experts named in a prospectus, accountants have
been subjected to litigation for various misstatements or omissions in
their client's public reports. Rule lOb-5 provides the broadest base for
potential recovery, and has in fact resulted in civil recovery from account-
ants not only for participation in the preparation of false financial state-
ments 8 but also for failure to take corrective action when errors are
subsequently discovered." These liabilities have been imposed without
regard to whether the accountant had utilized the misinformation or in-
side correct information to his own advantage, and at least one court pre-
cluded accountants from asserting any indemnification rights against their
client."c
The lawyers' constitutional immunity from otherwise broadly appli-
cable regulatory statutes is in some peril in the securities field. It has been
clear for some time that a lawyer may participate in a securities violation
84. The categories of persons statutorily liable, as well as the circumstances of
their liability and the defenses available to them, are set forth in §§ 11 and 15 of the
1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77o (1970), § 20 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1970),
and § 507(b) of the Indiana Securities Law, IND. CODE § 23-2-1-19 (1971), IND. ANN.
STAT. § 25-873 (1970).
85. 15 U.S.C. §77o (1970); IND. CoDE § 23-2-1-19(b) (1971), IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 25-873(b) (1970).
86. Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Wis. 1962), aff'd, 317 F.2d
637 (7th C-. 1963).
87. IND. CODE § 23-2-1-1(b) (1971), INm. ANN. STAT. § 25-854(b) (1970).
88. Drake v. Thor Power Tool Co., 282 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
89. Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
90. State Mut. Life Assurance Co. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 49 F.R.D.
202 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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in a manner that may subject him to administrative sanction and perhaps
civil liability if his role in the violation is "beyond the lawyer's normal
one."'" More recently, a lawyer who prepared the papers involved in
alleged violations of state blue sky law and Rule lOb-5 was held subject
to the jurisdiction of the federal court as a "participant" in the violation
on the ground that the transaction would not have proceeded without him.
The failure of the lawyer to advise the buyer that the shares were not
registered under the state statute was spoken of as a basis for the lawyer's
liability under Rule 10b-5. 2
The SEC has recently instituted litigation against two well known
New York and Chicago law firms, asserting that they violated Rule 10b-5
by their failure to resign from representation of their client or to disclose
to the SEC alleged misstatements in a pending proxy statement. 3 The
statement was not alleged to have been misleading when prepared; the
only contention was that it was subsequently found to be defective prior
to its public dissemination. Needless to, say the consequences of the SEC's
theory should be of enormous significance to the bar. The con-
tention is that the lawyer not only must abstain from assisting in a
violation of the law but must resign or report to the SEC if he discovers
a violation that is about to take place. Several problems arise related to
the attorney-client privilege. The resolution of these problems is not easy
in the face of the propositions that (a) the lawyer is obliged to disclose to
the other party or the appropriate tribunal if his client is about to commit
a fraud, 4 (b) the lawyer is obliged to hold in confidence the secrets
of his client, 5 and (c) violations of the securities laws can be crimes
as well as giving rise to civil liability. The result may be that professional
insurance will become unavailable and knowledgeable attorneys will
simply refuse to undertake such assignments. The lawyer's economic
stake in the transaction-his fee-is presently substantially out of pro-
portion to his exposure.
Another area of developing liability exposure involves the use of con-
fidential information to one's advantage in public or private transactions.
The classic case arose from the purchase of Texas Gulf Sulphur shares on
91. SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1968).
92. Black & Co. v. Nova-Tech, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 468 (D. Ore. 1971).
93. SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., Civil No. 225-72 (D.D.C., filed
Feb. 3, 1972).
94. AmERpCAN BAR AsSOcIATIoN, A-BA CODE or PROFESSiONAL REsPoNsIBmITY,
DISCIPLINARY RULE 7-102(b). Whether the SEC or a state commission is an ap-
propriate "tribunal" and whether violations of Rule lOb-5 constitute "fraud" are debat-
able and unresolved issues.
95. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REPSONSIBIi.TY,
CANON 4.
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the national securities markets prior to a news release of a major ore
strike. The purchases involved in that case were by directors, officers and
employees who received the information by virtue of their employment
positions and were therefore "insiders" whose purchases, without dis-
closing the information, violated Rule lOb-5.9" This violation subse-
quently formed the basis for civil actions on behalf of those who sold dur-
ing the period the information was withheld. The company whose shares
were being traded was held liable on the basis of its public statements
about the ore strike, even though it neither bought nor sold its stock nor
participated in any way in the open market transactions in its shares."
It also appears that an outsider who is the beneficiary of inside infor-
mation is likely to be held equally subject to Rule 10b-5, at least if he
comes into his information as the result of a conscious decision by an
insider."8 Since "insider" cases typically involve purchase rather than
sales by the malefactor, and since the seller would often be anonymous
on an Exchange, Rule 10b-5 has provided virtually the sole basis for
liability in the area of "insider" trading.
Persons other than the seller who "aid and abet" the violation of Rule
10b-5 may be held liable, but this concept, imported from the criminal law,
remains rather nebulous. The leading case, Brennan v. Midwestern
United Life Ins. Co.,99 sustained a claim by a class of customers of the
then insolvent Dobich Securities Corporation who had purchased shares
of the defendant's common stock in the open market through Dobich. The
court based Midwestern's liability on its failure to report certain of
Dobich's illegal activities to the Indiana Securities Commissioner. After
Brennan, some form of affirmative assistance to the principal violator
appears to be necessary along with some knowledge of the violation.
Whether benefit to the aider and abettor is required remains unclear.
There is some basis for concluding that any of the myriad regulations
governing securities transactions can be transformed into a claim under
Rule lOb-5 under the proper circumstances. In Buttrey v. Merrill, Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Sinith, '9 the complaint alleged violations of Rule lOb-5
claiming the defendant aided the same Dobich Securities Corporation
involved in Brennan. The court suggested that a knowing breach of a
rule of the New York Stock Exchange could constitute a fraud and
96. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969).
97. See Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1972).
98. it re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
99. 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
100. 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1969).
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hence a Rule lOb-5 violation.'' Similarly, breach of the National As-
sociation of Securities .Dealers "Rules of Fair Practice" may create a
lOb-5 cause of action against a NASD member-broker.''
Section 11 of the 1933 Act imposes liability on issuers for misstate-
ments in the registration regardless of their innocence, negligence or
wilfulness.' As to all other defendants, §§ 11, 12(2) and Indiana §
507(a) (2) each provide a relatively narrow defense described as lack of
"scienter" based on the defendant's reasonable ignorance of the misstate-
ment or omission. This defense may also be available under § 17 (a) or
Rule 10b-5, since it is arguable, as discussed before, that an implied
remedy may not eliminate the statutory defenses of the express remedy.
Further, § 10(b) is couched in terms of "deceptive" or "manipulative"
acts and "contrivances," each of which seems to bear a connotation of a
significant mental element or intent. Thus, the conclusion seems to be
that some form of knowledge, recklessness or negligence as to the mis-
leading nature of the statement or omission is necessary under Rule
10b-5. As in the case of materiality, however, the critical point is not
what in fact was in the defendant's mind, but what a jury will conclude
was there. In the case of complex financial transactions this defense is
often difficult to establish in the face of a sympathetic claimant's losses.
Finally, as to the often critical question of burden of proof on this issue,
the majority rule places that burden on the plaintiff as an element of
his case under Rule lOb-5. "'
Lastly, indemnification agreements between defendants have been
held invalid as contravening the policy of the securities laws if they seek
to reimburse for liabilities imposed by statute.. or if they are thought to
contravene public policy, specifically the desirability of public reliance on
accountant's certificates.'06 However, while indemnification provisions
may be unenforceable, § 11 (b) and § 507(a) (2) do provide for con-
tribution between defendants jointly liable.1"'
101. Id. at 141-43. The Rule involved was Rule 405, which mandated a member
firm of the Exchange to "know your customer" and his circumstances.
102. Avern Trust v. Clarke, 415 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1969).
103. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1) (1970).
104. See, e.g., Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909, 914 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 903 (1969).
105. Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
106. State Mut. Life Assurance Co. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 49 F.R.D.
202 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
107. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1970); IND. CoDE § 25-2-1-19(b) (1971), IND. ANN.
STAT. § 25-873(b) (1970). See also Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 318 F.
Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir. 1971).
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PROCEDURAL ADVANTAGES OF THE SEcuRITIEs LAWS
It is plain that the civil liability sections of the securities laws may
be invoked to afford redress for any number of wrongs that are also sub-
ject to vindication under state common law principles; notably fraud or
breach of corporate fiduciary relationships. It is also clear that no federal
pre-emption of state law is effected by the federal acts.' Even where a
state cause of action may be asserted, however, there are often significant
advantages or disadvantages to the plaintiff asserting a security claim as
well.
Generally, there are jurisdictional advantages to a plaintiff in bring-
ing a securities claim. First, federal court jurisdiction is available under
the 1933 and 1934 Acts" 9 without regard to the amount in controversy,
permitting aggregation of smaller claims otherwise unavailable in federal
court."' Second, while lOb-5 claims may only be initiated in federal
court,"' actions under §§ 11, 12(2) or 17(a) may be brought in "any
court of competent jurisdiction," federal or state."2 Moreover, actions
under the 1933 Act, if brought in a state court, are not removable." 8
Thus, by proper selection of the statutory basis of his claim, the plaintiff
may insure trial in a forum of his choice.
Personal jurisdiction over the defendant is readily available since
both the 1933 and 1934 Acts include a provision for service of process
wherever the defendant is an "inhabitant" or is "found.""-4 As a practi-
cal matter, these provisions permit consolidation of actions against
several defendants in various parts of the country as well as giving
wide choice of locale for suits against one or few defendants.
Federal venue can usually be found at the site of plaintiff's
choice. In federal court venue is proper for any 1933 Act claim in any
district in which the defendant "is found or is an inhabitant or transacts
108. Securities Act of 1933 § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1970); Crosby v. Well, 382
Ill. 538, 48 N.E.2d 386 (1943) ; Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(1970).
109. Securities Act of 1933 § 22, 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1970) Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).
110. See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969), holding that multiple claims could
not be accumulated to reach the 10,000 dollar jurisdictional amount required for suits
"arising under" federal law or based on diversity of citizenship.
111. Aetna State Bank v. Altheimer, 430 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1970).
112. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a), 771 (1970).
113. Securities Act of 1933 § 22, 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1970).
114. Securities Act of 1933 § 22, 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) (1970) ; Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970). The nationwide service provisions do not
apply to suits brought in state courts; thus, the state court litigant must resort to
the standard grounds for jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants. Negin v. Cico
Oil & Gas Co., 46 Misc. 2d 367, 257 N.Y.S.2d 434 (S. Ct. 1965).
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business" or in which the offer or sale took place, if the defendant partici-
pated in it."5 A 1934 Act claim may be asserted wherever "any act con-
stituting the violation occurred." ' These broad provisions have not been
narrowly construed. For example, a law firm has been held a "partici-
pant" in a sale by virtue of the inclusion of its name as counsel in reports
containing allegedly misleading information." 7 In the view of some
authorities, the omission of a material fact which constitutes a violation
of Rule lOb-5 takes place where the plaintiff happens to be, instead of
where the defendant is."' Finally, as mentioned previously, attorney's fees
are easy to recover if a claim can be sustained under Indiana §
507(a) (2).
Express statutes of limitations are provided for causes of action
under § 11 (a) and § 12(2) (one year from discovery)," 9 § 12(1) (one
year from sale), 2 and § 50 7 (a) (1) and (2) (two years from dis-
covery)."' No statute expressly purports to govern claims under §
17(a), Rule 10b-5 or Indiana § 401. It is now reasonably clear that the
appropriate state statute of limitations applies to the federal claims. "'
Two problems remain: (1) identifying which state's law applies; (2)
specifying which of the available statutes within a state are applicable.
The selection of the state has received little attention usually because
the forum state is both the place of the violation and the most familiar
to the court. With the expansion of claims to aiders and abetters and
others the issue may become more important. The statute of the forum
state has on occasion, and perhaps without reflection, been said to be the
settled choice. 3 If confronted with such a case, the courts should at least
consider looking to the conflicts of laws doctrines of the forum state.
Once the proper state is chosen, the question of the appropriate
statute remains. In most states there are several choices. In Indiana these
include the two-year statute applicable to "injuries to property" and to
actions "for forfeiture of penalty given by statute,'1 24 the two-year blue
sky statute, 2 ' the six-year fraud statute,'1 2 and the fifteen-year catch-
115. Securities Act of 1933 § 22, 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1970).
116. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).
117. Black & Co. v. Nova-Tech, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 468 (D. Ore. 1971).
118. Id.
119. 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1970).
120. Id.
121. IND. CODE § 23-2-1-19 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-873(e) (1970).
122. Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills, Inc., 455 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1972); Turner
v. Lundquist, 377 F.2d 44 (9th Cir. 1967).
123. See, e.g., Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir. 1970).
124. IND. Conx § 34-1-2-2 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-602 (1967).
125. Indiana Securities Law § 507(e), IND. CODE § 23-2-1-19 (1971), IND. ANN.
STAT. § 25-873(e) (1970).
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all.1 17 Decisions from other jurisdictions support each of the choices avail-
able under Indiana law.'28 However, the Seventh Circuit, probably the
final arbiter for Indiana, has recently given some help to those attempting
to assess their contingent liabilities under Rule 10b-5. In Morgan v.
Koch'20 the Seventh Circuit accepted the parties agreement that the
Indiana fraud statute applied to a Rule 10b-5 action. However, here
even the six-year statute had run, leaving no incentive for the defendant
to contend for the two-year statute. More recently, in Parrent v. Mid-
west Rag z Mills,"0 the Seventh Circuit has adopted the Illinois three-
year blue sky statute as applicable to a Rule 10b-5 claim, expressly noting
that in the Morgan decision neither party contested the district court's
adoption of the Indiana fraud statute. Since the Illinois statute is
basically similar to Indiana's, a plaintiff should assume that § 507(e)
of the Indiana blue sky law governs § 17(a) and Rule 10b-5 claims
brought in Indiana. The matter may not be fully resolved, however, as
one judge concurred in Parrent in a somewhat cryptic manner suggesting
possible disagreement with the holding insofar as it related to the statute
of limitations, and certain technical distinctions may be drawn between
the Indiana and Illinois statutes for this purpose.'
Another possible disadvantage to a plaintiff in bringing a claim for
violation of the securities laws is the possible unavailability of punitive
damages. There is a split of authority on the question whether punitive
damages may be awarded in a civil suit under the securities laws. One
line of cases adopts the view that since § 28(a) of the 1934 Act limits re-
covery under the Act to "actual damage,"' 2 punitive damages are un-
126. INn. CODE § 34-1-2-1 (1971), Im. ANN. STAT. § 2-601 (1967).
127. IND. CODE § 34-1-2-3 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-603 (1967).
128. Compare Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir. 1970) (blue sky
statute similar to Indiana's), with Charney v. Thomas, 372 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1967)
(fraud statute), and Azalea Meats, Inc. v. Muscat, 246 F. Supp. 780 (S.D. Fla. 1965)
(action for statutory violation).
129. 419 F.2d 993 (7th Cir. 1969).
130. 455 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1972).
131. Under ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121-Y, § 137.12 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972), it is il-
legal to engage in certain activities: the use of any "device, scheme or artifice to defraud
in connection with the sale or purchase of any security;" transactions "in the sale"
of a security which "tend to work a fraud;" and "obtaining money through the sale"
by means of misleading omissions or misstatements. These activities are broader in
scope than those which are expressly subject to civil liability under the Indiana statute.
However, the Illinois act is similar to Indiana's in that the sole civil remedy provided
for injury resulting from the proscribed activities is rescission. More importantly, the
Parrent court found the absence of a scienter defense significant in drawing the paral-
lel between the Illinois Act and Rule 10b-5. Indiana's act does provide a scienter
defense. It should be noted, however, that Parrent expressly approved of the result
in Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1223 (8th Cir. 1970), where the court found that
the statute of limitations in Arkansas' blue sky law, which is virtually identical to
Indiana's, did apply to § 17(a) and Rule 10b-5 claims.
132. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (a) (1970).
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available even under the implied remedy afforded by Rule 10b-5.13  Ho.w-
ever, punitive damages have been awarded in Rule 10b-5 cases on the
ground that any tort sustains such an award under the appropriate cir-
cumstances. In any event punitive damages may still be available under §
17(a) or § 401 since the 1933 Act, and the Indiana statutes, contain no
comparable reference to "actual" damages.'
THE MORAL
There are a few steps, short of withdrawing from the practice to
return to law school for a year's course in securities regulation, that may
be taken in the face of these unresolved and sometimes surprising conten-
tions. It should be reasonably clear that Rule 10b-5 has subsumed
virtually all other provisions of the securities laws as far as their impact
on normal transactions at the planning stage is concerned. Thus, for the
planner, the task is that of accurately transmitting all material facts in
connection with any purchase or sale of a security. The problems involved
in making adequate disclosure are often enormous and their resolution
can be expensive and time consuming, but the failure to do so can incur
severe risks. Anyone planning the acquisition of a corporation with sigli-
ficant value should resort to the preparation of a document substantially
similar to the requirements for an SEC cleared proxy statement for the
transactions. At the other extreme, the cost of such a document for the
formation of a two-man corporation is ordinarily out of proportion to
the benefit, even though that transaction is equally subject to Rule
10b-5. But even in simple cases, recall that unless a written investment
representation is given, the "sale" of "securities" violates § 507(a) (1)
of the Indiana securities laws regardless of the number of offerees.
In sum, at the planning level start with the presumption that there is
a securities aspect to a transaction and figure out why no registration is
required and why disclosure is adequate; at the litigation stage, considel
the relative merits of addition of or sole reliance upon a securities claim to
virtually any commercial suit. Finally, check the advance sheets, since
much of the foregoing will undoubtedly become obsolete in a relatively
short period.
133. See, e.g., deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970);
Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 913 (1970).
134. E.g., Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
135. See Nagel v. Prescott & Co., 36 F.R.D. 445 n.2 (N.D. Ohio 1964). But
see Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), in which it
was held that symmetry of the 1933 and 1934 Acts and the lack of any need for
punitive damages as a deterrent preclude their award under § 17(a).
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